{"id":64701,"date":"2026-07-25T09:18:41","date_gmt":"2026-07-25T13:18:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/overcentral.com\/en\/?p=64701"},"modified":"2026-07-25T09:18:41","modified_gmt":"2026-07-25T13:18:41","slug":"india-bitchat-takedown","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/overcentral.com\/en\/india-bitchat-takedown\/","title":{"rendered":"India Orders GitHub to Remove Bitchat Repositories"},"content":{"rendered":"

India’s Ministry of Home Affairs has ordered GitHub<\/a> to remove three repositories hosting Jack Dorsey’s decentralized messaging application Bitchat, marking one of the most aggressive actions yet by a government against a software platform whose primary crime is its ability to function without internet access. The takedown notice, issued by the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) at 11:16 p.m. on July 23, 2026, does not target unlawful content, illegal user activity, or specific malicious files stored in the repositories. Instead, it targets the software itself \u2014 its architecture, its capabilities, and the very premise of peer-to-peer communication that cannot be switched off by a central authority. The order gives GitHub, a subsidiary of Microsoft and the world’s largest software development platform, three hours to comply or risk losing the intermediary liability protections afforded under Indian law. The implications of this action extend far beyond a single app, raising fundamental questions about the boundaries of state power over open-source code<\/a>, the future of decentralized technologies, and the legal frameworks that govern the platforms where the world builds software.<\/p>\n

The Midnight Takedown Notice: What the Order Actually Says<\/h2>\n

The notice was issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read together with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Section 79(3)(b) provides that an intermediary loses its exemption from liability if it fails to remove or disable access to unlawful content upon receiving actual knowledge from a government agency. Rule 3(1)(d) requires intermediaries to remove content that violates Indian law. The I4C argued that the three repositories \u2014 github.com\/permissionlesstech\/bitchat<\/strong>, github.com\/permissionlesstech\/bitchat-android<\/strong>, and github.com\/permissionlesstech\/bitchat-android\/releases<\/strong> \u2014 contain information prohibited under Indian law and must be disabled immediately.<\/p>\n

Jack Dorsey, the former Twitter CEO who launched Bitchat in July 2025, made the order public, posting the notice on his own social media channels. The timing of the notice \u2014 issued just before midnight with a three-hour compliance deadline \u2014 drew immediate criticism from digital rights organizations. The Internet Freedom Foundation<\/a> (IFF) argued that the short window, combined with the late hour, effectively prevented any meaningful legal review or challenge before the deadline expired.<\/p>\n

What Is Bitchat? Understanding the Technology at the Center of the Controversy<\/h2>\n

Bitchat is an open-source messaging application that uses Bluetooth Low Energy<\/a> (BLE) to create mesh networks between nearby devices. Messages hop from phone to phone without requiring cellular service, Wi-Fi, or any centralized server infrastructure. The application supports end-to-end encryption and does not require users to register accounts, provide phone numbers, or submit to any form of identity verification. It is the combination of these features \u2014 no central servers, no accounts, no phone numbers, no internet dependency \u2014 that makes the platform uniquely resistant to censorship and surveillance.<\/p>\n

The application was designed explicitly for environments where internet access is unavailable, unreliable, or intentionally restricted. Dorsey has positioned Bitchat as a tool for free expression in authoritarian contexts, disaster zones, and areas affected by government-imposed network shutdowns. The app’s source code is publicly available on GitHub under the “permissionlesstech” organization, allowing anyone to inspect, modify, and distribute the software independently.<\/p>\n

How Bitchat Enables Anonymous Communication<\/h3>\n

Bitchat’s architecture means that there is no central point of control, no data center to raid, no server logs to subpoena, and no service provider to order to turn off the service. Law enforcement agencies that rely on intercepting communications at the network level, requesting user data from service providers, or shutting down servers to disrupt coordination cannot apply those same methods to a mesh network. Each device acts as both a client and a relay, and the network continues to function as long as any two devices are within Bluetooth range of each other.<\/p>\n

This is the feature that the Indian government finds most threatening. The I4C notice explicitly states that the platform could be used to facilitate riots, organized crime, terrorism, misinformation campaigns, and other criminal activity. The logic is straightforward: if protesters can communicate without internet access, then internet shutdowns \u2014 one of the most common tools used by Indian authorities to quell demonstrations \u2014 become ineffective.<\/p>\n

The Broader Context: Student Protests and Internet Shutdowns in New Delhi<\/h2>\n

The takedown order did not emerge from a vacuum. It comes amid ongoing student protests in New Delhi, particularly around Jantar Mantar, a historic site that has become a focal point for demonstrations. According to public reports cited by the Internet Freedom Foundation, authorities have repeatedly suspended mobile internet services in the area in an attempt to disrupt coordination among protesters. Bitchat became relevant in this context precisely because it allows nearby users to continue exchanging messages without internet connectivity during government-imposed network shutdowns.<\/p>\n

Amnesty International has also criticized India’s broader response to the demonstrations. The organization reported that authorities invoked powers under the National Security Act, which permits administrative detention without many of the procedural safeguards available in ordinary criminal proceedings. Amnesty warned that such measures threaten the rights to peaceful assembly, free expression, and protection from arbitrary detention. The takedown of Bitchat’s repositories, viewed in this light, is not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of escalating state action against tools that enable unsanctioned communication.<\/p>\n

Legal Questions: Section 69A vs. Section 79(3)(b)<\/h2>\n

One of the most significant legal questions raised by the I4C notice is whether the government used the correct legal mechanism to request the takedown. The Internet Freedom Foundation has argued that the government improperly relied on Section 79(3)(b) as a blocking mechanism instead of following the procedures established under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. Section 69A provides a specific framework for the government to block public access to information in the interest of national security, sovereignty, or public order, and it requires a designated review committee to approve such orders. Section 79(3)(b), by contrast, is part of the intermediary liability framework \u2014 it defines when a platform loses its safe harbor protections, not how the government should block content.<\/p>\n

IFF contends that the notice identifies no unlawful content contained in the repositories. The government did not point to specific files, messages, or data within the repositories that violate Indian law. Instead, it objected to the software’s capabilities and the possibility that it could be misused. This is a critical distinction. If the government can order a platform to remove code not because of what it does, but because of what it might enable, then the legal basis for protecting open-source software becomes dramatically weaker.<\/p>\n

What Is Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act?<\/h3>\n

Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, states that an intermediary shall not be liable for any third-party information hosted on its platform, provided that the intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge from a government agency that the information is unlawful, expeditiously removes or disables access to that information. If the intermediary fails to do so, it loses its safe harbor protection and becomes liable for the content. The provision is designed to ensure that platforms cooperate with law enforcement to remove clearly illegal content, such as child sexual abuse material, terrorist propaganda, or defamatory statements. Its application to open-source code repositories hosting a decentralized messaging application, where the alleged illegality is not the content itself but the potential use of the software, represents a significant expansion of the provision’s scope.<\/p>\n

The GitHub Factor: The World’s Largest Software Development Platform Under Pressure<\/h2>\n

GitHub, acquired by Microsoft in 2018 for $7.5 billion, hosts over 200 million code repositories and serves more than 100 million developers worldwide. The platform is governed by U.S. law but must comply with the legal requirements of the countries where it operates. GitHub regularly receives government requests to remove content or restrict access where required by local law. The company publishes a transparency report that details these requests, and it has historically resisted takedown demands that it considers overbroad or legally questionable.<\/p>\n

India is one of the most active countries in terms of government requests to GitHub. The platform’s status as a U.S. company adds a layer of complexity: while GitHub must comply with Indian law to operate in the country, it is also subject to U.S. law, including the First Amendment protections for speech and the limitations on government-mandated content removal. The Bitchat case tests the boundaries of this legal dualism. If GitHub complies with the Indian order, it may face criticism from free expression advocates in the United States and elsewhere. If it refuses, it risks losing its safe harbor protections in India, potentially exposing itself to legal liability for every piece of code hosted on its platform that Indian authorities deem unlawful.<\/p>\n

What Happens When a Government Targets Open-Source Code<\/h2>\n

The takedown order raises a fundamental question: can a government effectively ban open-source software? The answer is more complex than it might appear. Even if GitHub removes the three repositories from its platform, the code remains available on countless other platforms, including self-hosted Git servers, alternative code-hosting services like GitLab and SourceHug, and peer-to-peer distribution networks. Developers who already have copies of the repository can continue to modify, build, and distribute the application. The source code itself is not a secret \u2014 it is designed to be shared, copied, and forked.<\/p>\n

However, the order is not meaningless. GitHub is the primary distribution channel for the vast majority of open-source projects. Removing repositories from GitHub makes it harder for casual users to find the software, harder for developers to contribute to the project through the most widely used collaboration platform, and harder for the project to maintain visibility and legitimacy. The order also creates a chilling effect: other developers and projects may decide to self-censor or relocate to avoid similar legal exposure. And it establishes a precedent that the Indian government can use the same mechanism against other open-source projects that it considers problematic.<\/p>\n

The Response: Digital Rights Organizations Push Back<\/h2>\n

The Internet Freedom Foundation was the first major organization to respond publicly, condemning the takedown order as “unconstitutional and authoritarian.” IFF called on the government to withdraw the order, publish all takedown directions issued under the same legal authority, and restore internet connectivity around the Jantar Mantar protest area. The organization also demanded that the government follow the proper procedures under Section 69A rather than bypassing them through the intermediary liability framework.<\/p>\n

Amnesty International’s criticism of India’s broader response to the protests adds context to the Bitchat takedown. The organization’s warning about the use of the National Security Act to detain protesters without procedural safeguards suggests a broader pattern of state action against dissent. The Bitchat order, in this context, is not just about one app \u2014 it is about the government’s willingness to use legal tools to suppress the means of communication itself.<\/p>\n

What This Means for Decentralized Technology and Censorship Resistance<\/h2>\n

The Bitchat case is a harbinger of the conflicts to come between states and decentralized technologies. Traditional internet services \u2014 social media platforms, messaging apps, cloud providers \u2014 have centralized points of control that governments can pressure. A government can order a company to remove content, shut down a service, or hand over user data. Decentralized technologies, whether mesh networks, blockchain-based platforms, or peer-to-peer protocols, are designed precisely to eliminate these points of control. When a government cannot pressure a company to shut down a service, it may instead target the platforms where the software is distributed, the developers who write the code, or the infrastructure that supports the network.<\/p>\n

This is not the first time India has taken action against decentralized technologies. The government has previously explored regulatory frameworks for blockchain, considered restrictions on cryptocurrency, and debated the legal status of decentralized autonomous organizations. But the Bitchat order represents a direct confrontation between state power and the architecture of open-source, decentralized communication. The outcome will be watched closely by developers, digital rights advocates, and governments around the world.<\/p>\n

Unanswered Questions: Has GitHub Complied?<\/h2>\n

As of the time of writing, it remains unclear whether GitHub has complied with the removal request or intends to challenge it. The company has not issued a public statement. The three-hour compliance deadline has passed, but GitHub may have negotiated an extension, may have complied under protest, or may be preparing a legal challenge. The company’s response will set a significant precedent. If GitHub complies, it signals that the platform will honor takedown requests based on the potential misuse of software rather than the illegality of the content itself. If GitHub resists, it may trigger a legal battle that will clarify the limits of Indian authority over code hosted on a U.S. platform.<\/p>\n

Jack Dorsey, for his part, has shown no sign of backing down. The public release of the takedown notice appears designed to generate scrutiny and mobilize support. The Bitchat project is open-source, and even if GitHub removes the repositories, the code will continue to exist elsewhere. The practical impact of the order may be limited, but its symbolic and legal significance is substantial.<\/p>\n

The Indian government’s action against Bitchat is not merely a regulatory skirmish over a single messaging app. It is a test case for the proposition that a sovereign state can, through its legal system, suppress a technology whose defining characteristic is its resistance to state control. The outcome of this test will shape the future of open-source development, the boundaries of intermediary liability, and the viability of decentralized communication tools in an era of increasingly sophisticated state surveillance and censorship. The code itself may be immutable, but the legal and political environment in which it lives is not.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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