On January 1, 2024, the Supreme Court of Israel issued a ruling that reshaped the country’s constitutional order. For the first time in its history, a full bench of 15 justices struck down an amendment to a Basic Law, invalidating the centerpiece of the government’s sweeping judicial overhaul: the “reasonableness amendment,” which had barred courts from reviewing government decisions on reasonableness grounds. The 8\u20137 decision was razor-thin, but its implications are monumental, cementing the court’s role as a final arbiter not just of ordinary legislation, but of the constitutional framework itself. To understand how Israel arrived at this crossroads, and what it means for the balance of power in one of the world\u2019s most contested democracies, a deeper look at the court\u2019s origins, powers, and current crisis is essential.<\/p>\n
The Supreme Court of Israel was established in 1948, immediately after the declaration of the state. Rather than building a legal system from scratch<\/a>, Israel absorbed the procedural foundation and common-law principles of the British Mandate legal system that had governed the territory. This inheritance continues to shape the court today, most notably in its unique role as a court of first instance for petitions against the government. Like the Supreme Court of India, which emerged from a similar post-colonial transition around the same time, Israel\u2019s court built its expansive power and heavy caseload on these foundations.<\/p>\n The British had concentrated judicial review in the highest court, staffing it primarily with British judges to prevent local Jewish and Arab judges in lower courts from ruling on government actions. Israel absorbed this arrangement wholesale, and it later became the foundation of the court’s constitutional authority.<\/p>\n One of the most distinctive features of the Israeli Supreme Court is its dual capacity. It serves as the highest appellate tribunal for civil, criminal, and administrative matters, hearing appeals from Israel\u2019s six district courts and, by leave, from 29 magistrates’ courts. But its second role is far more consequential: it sits as the High Court of Justice, exercising original jurisdiction as a court of first and last instance over petitions filed by individuals, NGOs, or politicians against government bodies, ministers, the military, and state authorities.<\/p>\n This structure produces two defining features. The first is an extraordinary, non-discretionary caseload. Because the court cannot refuse mandatory appeals or High Court petitions, it received over 11,000 new filings in 2024 alone, including 2,892 High Court petitions. The second is remarkable immediacy: petitions alleging government overreach or constitutional violations reach the highest court directly without prior lower-court proceedings and are resolved in roughly two and a half months on average. This immediacy forms a cornerstone of the court\u2019s political power, allowing it to adjudicate major public debates in real time.<\/p>\n The road to judicial review was unusual. Israel has no single written constitution. Instead, the Knesset enacts Basic Laws, intended as chapters of a future constitution, which are usually amendable by a simple majority. In the landmark 1995 ruling Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal<\/em>, the court held that Basic Laws function as Israel’s constitutional framework, establishing that the judiciary may strike down ordinary legislation that violates the rights they protect. This was Israel’s Marbury v. Madison<\/em> moment.<\/p>\n Since 1995, the court has invalidated statutes or statutory provisions in only 25 cases, most of them between 2010 and 2020. By the standards of other supreme courts \u2014 such as those of the United States, Canada, and India \u2014 the Israeli court strikes down legislation relatively rarely. Most invalidated laws concerned prisoners’ rights, immigration, and taxation, matters largely at the margins of political debate. The main exception has been the politically charged issue of military draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men.<\/p>\n In January 2024, the court took a dramatic step further. Sitting en banc for the first time in its history, it ruled in Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset<\/em> that it possesses authority to review Basic Laws themselves and strike down an amendment that negates Israel\u2019s core identity as a Jewish and democratic state. A large majority of 12 justices affirmed that authority, and a narrow 8\u20137 majority then struck down the reasonableness amendment, which had barred courts from reviewing government decisions on reasonableness grounds.<\/p>\n The court has 15 justices at full strength, though it almost never sits en banc. More than 99% of panel cases are heard by three justices, a necessity driven by the overwhelming docket. Panels are expanded for mandatory procedures such as election appeals, or at the discretion of the president of the court. Existing law grants the president broad authority over both panel size and composition, a power that has become increasingly controversial as critics argue it allows the president to shape outcomes in sensitive political cases.<\/p>\n Judges are chosen by a nine-member judicial selection committee: the justice minister and another cabinet minister, two Knesset members (by custom, one from the opposition), three Supreme Court justices, and two representatives of the Israel Bar Association. No single branch controls the committee, and professionals hold the majority \u2014 five of the nine seats. Since 2008, appointing a justice has required a seven-vote supermajority, meaning neither politicians nor judges can appoint a justice over the other side’s objection. In practice, this mutual veto has forced compromise, producing benches that mix liberal and conservative justices.<\/p>\n That system is now in flux. In March 2025, the Knesset amended a Basic Law to replace the two bar representatives with lawyers chosen by politicians, flipping the committee\u2019s professional majority into a political one. The amendment takes effect only after the next election, but petitions against it are pending before all 11 sitting justices, who heard arguments in the summer of 2025. The body deciding the amendment’s fate is the very court that first claimed the power to strike down amendments to Basic Laws.<\/p>\n Justices serve no fixed term. Once appointed, they hold tenure until mandatory retirement at age 70, making judicial departures predictable. Historically, most justices joined the court in their mid-50s or 60s and served for about a decade. But as political battles over the court intensified, the appointment age itself became strategic. Some justices were appointed in their mid-to-late 40s, extending their influence for two decades or more, while others were chosen close to retirement to limit their tenure. The 2025 amendment directly addresses this: if it takes effect, nominees under 55 could join the court only with the unanimous consent of the committee.<\/p>\n Cases are decided by simple majority, and there is no formal rule for assigning the opinion writer. Justices on a panel settle among themselves who will write the lead opinion, which then circulates for revisions, concurrences, or dissents. However, the far stronger tradition is consensus. In the Israeli Supreme Court Database, covering all panel decisions from 2010 to 2018, only about 1% of routine three-justice cases include a dissent.<\/p>\n Institutional features sustain this high consensus norm: a court deciding thousands of cases a year has little time for separate writing; a mandatory docket is dominated by routine appeals rather than ideologically charged controversies; and on a three-justice panel, open disagreement carries a steep collegial cost. The telling finding is what happens when those conditions change. Dissent climbs steadily as panel size grows. In the rare cases heard by nine or more justices \u2014 the court’s most consequential decisions \u2014 about 55% include at least one dissent, a rate remarkably close to that of the U.S. Supreme Court.<\/p>\nHow the Israeli Supreme Court Exercises Original Jurisdiction<\/h2>\n
When Did the Israeli Supreme Court Gain the Power to Strike Down Laws?<\/h2>\n
How Often Does the Court Strike Down Legislation?<\/h3>\n
The Structure and Selection of Israel\u2019s 15 Justices<\/h2>\n
How Are Israeli Supreme Court Justices Selected?<\/h3>\n
Do Justices Serve Fixed Terms?<\/h3>\n
Consensus and Dissent on the Israeli Bench<\/h2>\n
The Court as an Institutional Check in a Parliamentary System<\/h2>\n